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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

EXPLORING THE INTERSECTION OF TRADE POLICY,
IMMIGRATION, AND TAX LAW: A COORDINATED TAX
RESPONSE TO THE “PUSH” FACTORS DRIVING THE CURRENT
WAVE OF MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES FROM
CENTRAL AMERICA

GENEVIEVE TOKIĆ*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, much attention has been given to an unprecedented wave of
immigration from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador (the “Northern
Triangle” of Central America) to the United States. A 2015 report by the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL–
CIO”) entitled “Trade, Violence and Migration: The Broken Promises to
Honduran Workers” 1 cited a combination of factors, including historic economic
policies of the Honduran government (which include tax breaks for foreign
manufacturing operations through the maquiladora regime and tariff-free export
processing zones) and the implementation of the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (“CAFTA”) in 2006, 2 as drivers for the deteriorating security
situation in Honduras, 3 which now has one of the highest murder rates in the
world. 4 This climate of violence, together with increasing inequality and lack of
economic opportunity, which are present in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well,

* Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. The author wishes to thank
Anushi Trivedi for research assistance. And of course many thanks are due to all the organizers and
participants at the Sanford E. Sarasohn Conference on Critical Issues in Comparative and
International Taxation II: Taxation and Migration. All errors and omissions are the author’s own.
1. AFL-CIO, TRADE, VIOLENCE AND MIGRATION: THE BROKEN PROMISES TO HONDURAN
WORKERS 1 (2015) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Report], https://aflcio.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/
Honduras.PDF [https://perma.cc/6H37-7FJT].
2. In addition to Honduras, the parties to CAFTA are the United States, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic; hence it is sometimes referred to as
DR-CAFTA. This Paper will use the acronym “CAFTA” to refer to the agreement. Bureau of Econ.
& Bus. Affairs, 2012 Investment Climate Statement - Honduras, U.S. DEP’T STATE (June 2012),
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191162.htm [https://perma.cc/H2FD-BGW9].
3. AFL-CIO Report, supra note 1, at 5, 7.
4. Guy Taylor & Stephen Dinan, Violence Surges in Central America, Threatening New
Refugee Flood, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/10
/el-salvador-honduras-guatemala-violence-surges-thr/?page=all [https://perma.cc/8PFE-BT6Y].
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appear to be the drivers of the new wave of immigration from the Northern
Triangle to the United States. 5
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador all have severe socioeconomic
problems contributing to the current wave of immigration. CAFTA was
portrayed as a partial solution to this situation, promising to bring economic
development to these countries. 6 This promise has not been fulfilled as of yet;
minimal increases in foreign direct investment and economic growth in the
Northern Triangle since 2006 have been insufficient to remedy high poverty
levels, and growth has been unequally distributed. 7 For the promises of free trade
to be fulfilled, further reforms are needed, both internationally and domestically.
Among these changes, international tax reforms may play an important role.
This Paper explores the nexus between trade policies, the current wave of
immigration from the Northern Triangle countries, and tax policy. Because of
the importance of U.S. investment to the economies of the Northern Triangle
countries, U.S. international tax laws impacting transactions and investment
decisions by U.S. companies may have a significant impact on the “success” of
CAFTA in delivering growth through improved free trade between the CAFTA
member states. Among other things, the Paper will advocate for the enactment
of tax treaties between the U.S. and CAFTA member countries. In addition, the
Paper will explore other international tax policy initiatives that could help the
Northern Triangle countries raise much-needed tax revenue and alleviate some
of the distortions caused by current international tax policy in terms of
investment decision-making.
I. EMIGRATION FROM THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND ITS CAUSES
Immigration from the Northern Triangle has increased significantly in the
second decade of the twenty-first century. Most of this is due to a surge in illegal
migration. 8 As of 2013, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador had a combined
estimated population of approximately thirty million people. 9 Of this total, it
was estimated that approximately 2.7 million people, or 9% of the total

5. AFL-CIO Report, supra note 1, at 3, 5, 18. These factors are sometimes referred to as
“push” factors in driving immigrants from these countries to the United States (as opposed to “pull”
factors, which refer to the climate in the United States itself that attracts migrants to come). Id. at
5, 21.
6. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Report, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing effects of CAFTA on Honduras).
7. See, e.g., id. at 8.
8. Taylor & Dinan, supra note 4.
9. El Salvador: Population, Total, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/elsalvador [https://perma.cc/L7P4-GJVR] (showing a 2013 population of 6.2 million); Guatemala:
Population, Total, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala [https://perma.cc/
N79X-EFWS] (showing a 2013 population of 15.5 million); Honduras: Population, Total, WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras?view=chart [https://perma.cc/N5JL-FTUM]
(showing a 2013 population of 8.6 million).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

EXPLORING THE INTERSECTION OF TRADE POLICY

139

populations, were living in the United States. 10 This was an increase of 80% (up
from approximately 1.5 million) since 2001. 11 Many more Northern Triangle
nationals have tried to reach the United States and failed. 12 Around the end of
the first decade of the twenty-first century, the number of asylum and refugee
applications from the Northern Triangle also surged. 13 The number of people
from the three Northern Triangle countries requesting asylum in the neighboring
countries of Belize, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama increased by
“1,179% from 2008 to 2014, while asylum requests increased by 370% for the
United States over the same time period.” 14
Clearly, the usual mix of “push” and “pull” factors that has fed a steady but
small stream of immigrants from the Northern Triangle over decades has shifted
dramatically, and the statistics appear to indicate that it is the “push” factors—
what is happening on the ground in these countries—that is causing the exodus.
Numerous sources have identified poor economic conditions and job prospects
for the young, coupled with rising levels of violent crime and gang activity, as
the primary causes. 15 The majority of unauthorized migrants from the Northern
Triangle countries are young, poorly educated, and male. 16 In addition, many
10. Danielle Renwick, Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/central-americas-violent-northerntriangle/p37286 [https://perma.cc/MG57-TAG7].
11. Id.
12. Reports indicate that nearly 500,000 people from the Northern Triangle were apprehended
in Mexico between 2010 and 2015. RODRIGO DOMINGUEZ VILLEGAS & VICTORIA RIETIG,
MIGRATION POLICY INST., MIGRANTS DEPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO TO THE
NORTHERN TRIANGLE: A STATISTICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE 5 (2015). 100,000 Northern
Triangle nationals were apprehended in the United States and Mexico in 2010, and more than
340,000 were apprehended in 2014. Id.
13. Renwick, supra note 10 (“Between 2009 and 2013, the United States registered a
sevenfold increase in asylum seekers at its southern border, 70 percent of whom came form the
Northern Triangle.” (citation omitted)).
14. Silva Mathema, They Are Refugees: An Increasing Number of People Are Fleeing
Violence in the Northern Triangle, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 24, 2016, 12:35 PM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2016/02/24/131645/they-arerefugees-an-increasing-number-of-people-are-fleeing-violence-in-the-northern-triangle/
[https://perma.cc/Q9XG-D473]. The refugee and asylum requests are primarily based on claims of
persecution by gangs and cartels, which the police and government forces are either unwilling or
unable to stop. See Dennis Stinchcomb & Eric Hershberg, Unaccompanied Migrant Children from
Central America: Context, Causes, and Responses 34 (Am. Univ. Ctr. for Latin Am. & Latino
Studies Working Paper Series, Paper No. 7, Nov. 2014).
15. See AFL-CIO Report, supra note 1, at 5; see also PETER J. MEYER ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43702, UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN FROM CENTRAL AMERICA: FOREIGN
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 24 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43702.pdf [https://perma.
cc/AT5X-XQ6U] [hereinafter CRS Report].
16. VILLEGAS & RIETIG, supra note 12, at 12–13 (noting that most deportees to the Northern
Triangle, which is assumed to be representative of unauthorized migrants overall, are between ages
20–29, with other significant numbers in the age range 30–39; deportees are 83 percent male; more
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are unemployed or work in agriculture or other unskilled employment. 17 The
demographic profile of the immigrants is in keeping with the “push” factors
identified by the various sources.
II. THE TRADE-IMMIGRATION NEXUS AND THE ROLE OF TAXATION IN FREE
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
The socioeconomic problems facing the Northern Triangle countries are
deep-seated and long-standing. In the early part of the twenty-first century, the
administration of George W. Bush worked extensively to promote free trade in
the Western Hemisphere, and one much-touted (but unproven) benefit of these
policies was that they would bring economic development to depressed Latin
American economies. 18 CAFTA, negotiated, signed, and implemented against
this background, was in part based on the 1994 North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”), but the economic profile of CAFTA countries, which
are among the poorest in the Western Hemisphere, was quite different from
those of Canada and Mexico at the time NAFTA was signed ten years earlier.
For example, while U.S. investment in Mexico was fairly broad even before the
implementation of NAFTA, U.S. investment in Honduras is more limited and
highly concentrated in the manufacturing (maquila) sector and in wholesale
trade, 19 yet still represents approximately 70% of the country’s foreign direct
investment. 20 The maquiladora industry flourishes in part because of its ability
to attract foreign investment with tax breaks and exemptions for large
companies. 21 At the same time, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador all suffer
than 80 percent of deportees from Guatemala and Honduras have a secondary education or less;
migrants from El Salvador are slightly better educated, but still only 35% have finished high school
or more).
17. Id. at 14 (noting that based on a survey of deportees, only 14% had any kind of skilled
employment experience).
18. Grant D. Aldonas, The FTAA: Mapping the Road to Economic Growth and Development,
7 ECON. PERSP. 17, 17 (2002) (“Implementing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) ‘is
critical at this juncture in the history and development of the Western Hemisphere’ . . . . In addition
to increasing economic prosperity throughout the hemisphere, the FTAA would open the door to
long-term social and political initiatives that will strengthen democracy and regional stability.”
(quoting Commerce Under Secretary for International Trade, Grant Aldonas)).
19. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2015 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT: HONDURAS 3 (2015),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241799.pdf [https://perma.cc/95BF-CETD].
20. See id. (showing approximately 900 million USD of U.S. foreign direct investment in
2014); Honduras: Foreign Investment up 5% in 2015, CENTRALAMERICADATA.COM (Mar. 11,
2016), https://en.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Honduras_Foreign_Investment_Up_5_
in_2015 [https://perma.cc/8CBC-4D6S] (showing a total of 1.2 billion USD in foreign direct
investment into Honduras for 2015).
21. See AFL-CIO Report, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining how the maquiladora industry in
Honduras offers “incentives such as tax exemptions, duty-free imports of raw materials and
machinery, and the ability to repatriate profits” and focuses on attracting foreign investment rather
than supporting small businesses).
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from insufficient government revenue and regressive tax systems. 22 These
factors also exacerbate conditions for the working poor, and contribute to
inequality, which is associated with higher levels of violence, furthering a
vicious cycle that discourages foreign investment and inhibits development. 23
CAFTA has not been the economic panacea it was promised to be. 24 In order
to reduce incentives to migrate, reforms are needed to bring economic growth to
the Northern Triangle, increase wages, and reduce inequality. The governments
will also need revenue and other assistance to combat crime and instability. Lack
of economic opportunity and inequality, together with other factors leading to
violent crime, further exacerbate violence and the power of organized criminal
gangs in the drug trade and other “underground” economic activities. 25 While
addressing all these issues is well beyond the scope of this Paper, this Part will
focus on the role of free trade in bringing economic development to the Northern
Triangle, as well as the role of international taxation in promoting and
supporting that development.
A.

Trade-Immigration Nexus?

CAFTA, like NAFTA before it, was publicly hailed as a boon for the
economies of the member states, a measure that would improve the economies
of developing countries, thus reducing illegal immigration to the United States. 26
However, such predictions have not yet come to pass for the Northern Triangle
countries in the wake of CAFTA. 27
22. See PETER J. MEYER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43702, UNACCOMPANIED
CHILDREN FROM CENTRAL AMERICA: FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 25 (2016).
23. Id. at 24.
24. See, e.g., AFL-CIO report, supra note 1, at 7–8.
25. Scott Rempell, Credible Fears, Unaccompanied Minors, and the Causes of the
Southwestern Border Surge, 18 CHAPMAN L. REV. 337, 354–55 (2015) (discussing the
militarization of Central America as a result of violent civil wars in the 1980s, weak governments
powerless to effectively control organized crime, and the role of economic marginalization in the
creation of Central American gangs).
26. See, e.g., AFI-CLO Report, supra note 1, at 7, 18 (discussing anticipated goals of CAFTA
for Honduras); see also Taylor & Dinan, supra note 4 (showing that as of 2013, more than 1.2
million Northern Triangle nationals are living in the United States illegally).
27. See, e.g., AFI-CLO Report, supra note 1, at 7–8, 18 (stating that CAFTA has only
“exacerbated the desperation and instability in Honduras” and that migration is a means “to escape
violence or seek employment opportunity”). Similar statements had been made surrounding
NAFTA, and a popularly held expectation for NAFTA was that it would reduce immigration from
Mexico. See Jagdeep S. Bhandari, Migration and Trade Policies: Symmetry or Paradox?, 6
HOFSTRA J. INT’L BUS. & L. 17, 18 n.4 (2007). In the first fifteen or so years following NAFTA,
however, there was actually an increase in Mexico-U.S. immigration, which only slowed in the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Felicity Lawrence, Trump Is Right: Nafta Is a Disaster. But
US Workers Aren’t the Big Losers, GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2016/nov/18/trump-nafta-us-workers-not-big-losers-mexican-workers-suffer-most
[https://perma.cc/6D6F-A7JG]. Some observers did predict at least a short-term increase in
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The empirical and scholarly work on the interrelationship between trade and
immigration indicates some nexus between the two. 28 Some frameworks
indicate that trade liberalization may increase wage disparities between a “core”
country trading partner and the “periphery,” and thus contribute to increased
migration. 29 More recently, work focused on NAFTA predicted a short-term
“migration hump” in the aftermath of trade liberalization. On this theory, longterm impacts of trade liberalization may eventually reduce illegal immigration,
but in the short-term will serve to increase it. In fact, this appears to be what
happened in Mexico. 30 To some extent, this “migration hump” may describe the
phenomenon occurring with the Northern Triangle countries, but twelve years
after the signing of CAFTA, with immigration only increasing, it is clear that
significant changes need to occur to slow the exodus from the Northern Triangle
and deliver on the promises of CAFTA to improve economic conditions in
Central America.
Focusing specifically on certain aspects of the economies of Northern
Triangle countries, it appears that trade policy over the past two decades has had
a negative impact on jobs and economic opportunity in the region. CAFTA has
caused significant “adjustment costs” in the sensitive agricultural sector, which
historically employs significant numbers of workers in the Northern Triangle. 31

migration from Mexico in the wake of NAFTA, however. Philip Martin, Mexico-US Migration, in
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., NAFTA REVISITED:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 441, 449 (2005) (explaining why NAFTA was accompanied
by an increase in Mexico-US migration).
28. Bhandari, supra note 27, at 34; cf. Margaret E. Peters, Open Trade, Closed Borders:
Immigration Policy in the Era of Globalization, 67 WORLD POL. 114, 121, 149 (2015) (discussing
research tending to show that open trade policy is generally accompanied by restricted immigration
policies, noting the substitutability of trade in goods and trade in labor; however, the article does
not address any link between illegal immigration and trade liberalization). There is much scholarly
discussion of the economic hypothesis that trade in goods and migration (i.e., trade in labor) are
substitutes. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican
Immigration to the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937, 965 (1994) (“Labor migration and
capital flow are related to international trade . . . [and] . . . ‘in the absence of protectionism, trade
among countries with different factor endowments is a substitute for migration.’” (quoting Dolores
Acevedo & Thomas J. Espenshade, Implications of a North American Free Trade Agreement for
Mexican Migration into the United States, 18 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 729, 730–31 (1992))).
29. Bhandari, supra note 27, at 32; see also PAUL R. KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE 2
(1991).
30. “[T]he number of unauthorized Mexicans living in the United States rose from an
estimated 2.5 million in 1995 to 4.5 million in 2000, representing an annual increase of 400,000 a
year.” Martin, supra note 27, at 449. However, more recently there appears to have been no net
migration to the United States from Mexico. See, e.g., Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, More Mexicans
Leaving than Coming to the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.pewhispanic.org/
2015/11/19/more-mexicans-leaving-than-coming-to-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/XAC8-P2QK].
31. See J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42468, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLICCENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA-DR): DEVELOPMENTS
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Increased competition from the U.S. agricultural industry has driven prices
down, and trade policy has not generally compensated for this by creating
sufficient jobs in other sectors. 32 For example, the phase-out of the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement (“MFA”), a multilateral agreement imposing quotas on textiles
and clothing that could be imported from developing countries, appears to have
contributed to a decline in the number of textile and clothing exports from
Central America. 33 The phase-out of the MFA was completed in 2005; between
2005 and 2012, textile exports from the CAFTA countries declined by 14%. 34
This appears to be due, at least in part, to increased competition from the textile
industries in Asia in the aftermath of the MFA. 35 Thus, the loss of agricultural
jobs has pushed rural workers toward the cities in search of new opportunities,
but such opportunities are often lacking. Large numbers of under- and
unemployed workers concentrated in urban centers are easy prey for gangs,
drug-traffickers, and other criminal operations seeking additional manpower.
Pre-dating CAFTA, the maquiladora policies adopted in the Northern
Triangle have also contributed to migration from the region to the United
States. 36 The implementation of CAFTA has only cemented the importance of
maquilas to the manufacturing industry in these countries. Economic evidence
indicates that the maquiladora system has benefited the economies of countries
in the Northern Triangle. 37 However, this has not necessarily helped the working
class in the region. Foreign direct investment in manufacturing attracted by the
maquila system has not led to the same positive spillover effects in Central

TRADE AND INVESTMENT 4 (2012) (“[A]gricultural sectors bear most of the trade adjustment
costs . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Report, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing effects of CAFTA on Honduras);
see also Samuel Morley, Eduardo Nakasone & Valeria Piñeiro, The Impact of CAFTA on
Employment, Production and Poverty in Honduras 31, 45 (Int’l Food Policy Research Inst.,
Discussion Paper No. 00748, Jan. 2008) (noting a small impact on employment and economic
growth from CAFTA trade liberalization, with most of the growth attributable to the maquila sector,
and estimating this would result in modest reductions in poverty by 2020).
33. STACEY FREDERICK, JENNIFER BAIR & GARY GEREFFI, DUKE CTR. ON GLOBALIZATION,
GOVERNANCE & COMPETITIVENESS, NICARAGUA AND THE APPAREL VALUE CHAIN IN THE
AMERICAS: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT 4 (2014).
34. Id. at 4. However, there is some variation within the CAFTA region, and the Northern
Triangle. While market share declined for all Northern Triangle countries between 2005 and 2012,
El Salvador and Honduras have seen a slight increase in the overall value of exports in spite of their
market share decline, while Guatemala has experienced a decrease in export value. Id. at 5.
35. Id.
36. See PETER A. CRETICOS & ELEANOR SOHNEN, WILSON CTR. & MIGRATION POLICY
INST., MANUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES, MEXICO, AND CENTRAL AMERICA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITIVENESS AND MIGRATION 1 (2013) (noting that immigrants from
Mexico and the Northern Triangle “make up 8 percent (1.3 million people) of the US manufacturing
force”).
37. For example, in 2008, maquila manufacturing contributed eleven percent of El Salvador’s
GDP. Id. at 4.
IN
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America as it has in other regions such as East Asia. 38 This may be in part
because traditional maquiladora manufacturing dissociates the manufacturing
process from R&D and innovation. 39 Further, the manufacturing jobs in the
maquilas are extremely low wage, paying approximately the average wage rate
for all workers in the local economy. 40 While low- or unskilled manufacturing
jobs are considered low wage in the United States, U.S. manufacturing wages
are still significantly higher than the wages for similar work in the Northern
Triangle. 41
While the Northern Triangle countries appear to have experienced positive
GDP per capita growth since CAFTA, the gains are modest 42 and are unevenly
distributed, as evidenced by severe income inequality in the region. 43 Of course,
the myriad economic problems facing the Northern Triangle have explanations
that go well beyond trade policy. Nonetheless, the foregoing discussion shows
the importance of considering the impacts of trade policy, especially in light of
the stated goals of agreements such as CAFTA with respect to development and
immigration. As the liberalization of trade has not yet had a positive impact on
outward migration from the Northern Triangle, other policy reforms should be
considered. The following Section turns to the role of taxation, with a focus on
how tax policy furthers or undermines the goals of relevant trade policy.
B.

The Role of Taxation

Among the most important purported benefits of free trade agreements such
as CAFTA is that they facilitate foreign direct investment (“FDI”). 44 Because
trade agreements between developed and developing countries often result in a
decline in the agricultural sector for the poorer country, the promised investment

38. Id.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id. at 8.
41. CRETICOS & SOHNEN, supra note 36, at 8.
42. See GDP Per Capita: Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, WORLD BANK
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KN?locations=HN-GT-SV&year_high_desc
=true [https://perma.cc/V5JY-2ZSK].
43. See, e.g., Raiesa Ali, Income Inequality and Poverty: A Comparison of Brazil and
Honduras, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (July 1, 2015), http://www.coha.org/income-ine
quality-and-poverty-a-comparison-of-brazil-and-honduras/#_ftnref15 [https://perma.cc/DZH7-Y
YDE] (describing Honduras as one of the most unequal countries in Latin America in terms of
distribution of income); Maynor Cabrera, Nora Lustig & Hilcías E. Morán, Fiscal Policy,
Inequality, and the Ethnic Divide in Guatemala, 76 WORLD DEV. 263, 263 (2015) (describing
Guatemala as one of the most unequal countries in Latin America).
44. See, e.g., Anthony J. Venables, Regional Integration Agreements: A Force for
Convergence or Divergence? 20 (The World Bank Policy Research Grp., Policy Research Working
Paper No. 2260, Dec. 1999), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/397421468766807036/
pdf/multi-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VQ7-RL4P] (recognizing that free trade agreements
“typically promote foreign direct investment”).
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can make up for this through providing manufacturing and other jobs for
displaced rural and agricultural workers. 45 However, this does not always occur,
and is much less likely in the case of free trade agreements between low-income
and high-income countries. Even where new free trade does result in increased
FDI, such investment may concentrate in low-wage industries, such as, in the
case of Honduras, the maquiladoras. While the maquila industry employs
significant numbers of people, such jobs are criticized for offering only
subsistence wages, 46 and government revenue from the programs is limited as a
result of tax breaks to foreign nationals and the removal of tariffs through free
trade agreements and export processing zones. 47 At the same time, the local tax
breaks may not always operate as intended, thanks to the worldwide taxation of
U.S. businesses under the federal income tax code. 48
In spite of the failure of CAFTA so far to deliver on the promise of increased
FDI in a meaningful way, there may be tax reforms that could help attract
beneficial FDI. 49 These changes can be both local and bilateral or multilateral.
From a local taxation perspective, the Northern Triangle countries struggle with
effective taxation. In all three countries, rates of tax evasion are high. 50 Tax
45. See Morley et al., supra note 32, at 20.
46. See Elvia R. Arriola, Voices from the Barbed Wires of Despair: Women in the
Maquiladoras, Latina Critical Legal Theory, and Gender at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 DEPAUL
L. REV. 729, 731 n.3 (2000) (generally discussing low wages for maquiladora workers).
“[Maquiladoras are] in-process assembly plants owned by transnational corporations that operate
primarily in the export market. They are not manufacturing plants but rather processors or
assemblers of component parts produced in the home country of the corporation.” Id. (citation
omitted).
47. AFl-CIO Report, supra note 1, at 7.
48. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 2
(2013) (“The U.S. government taxes both the domestic and foreign income of businesses that are
incorporated in the United States and that operate abroad.”). Thus, while U.S. interests doing
business in the Northern Triangle may enjoy lower local taxes, they still face the same level of U.S
taxation when any profits they earn overseas are repatriated to the United States. Id. at 9.
Furthermore, the U.S. tax credit system essentially ensures that U.S. companies operating overseas
ultimately pay the higher of the foreign or the U.S. tax rate on their income. Id. Thus, foreign tax
breaks are only valuable to the extent of the availability of deferral of the U.S. tax.
49. However, recent scholarship has challenged the conventional wisdom that attracting FDI
is the best way to improve economic conditions in developing countries, and that using tax
incentives to do so may be counter-productive. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, The Future of Tax
Incentives for Developing Countries, in TAX, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 25, 26, 32 (Yariv Brauner
& Miranda Stewart eds., 2013).
50. See, e.g., Instituciones, Impuestos, y Desigualdad en Guatemala [Institutions, Taxes, and
Inequality in Guatemala], WOODROW WILSON CTR. UPDATE ON THE AMS. (Wilson Ctr., Wash.
D.C.), Sept. 2013, at 2, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Guatemala%20V2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J8WU-QP3S] (explaining how Guatemala has the lowest levels of tax collection
in the Latin American region); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD] ET AL.,
REVENUE STATISTICS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 1990-2014, at 32 (2016)
(explaining that high levels of informality in tax systems exclude many people from paying taxes
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revenues are insufficient to support government spending on effective antipoverty programs, a social safety net, or infrastructure and other reforms that
could improve job opportunities and economic outlook generally. In addition,
the governments often provide tax breaks in order to attract foreign investment,
as in the maquila industry. 51 This is evidence of the dilemma faced by many
developing countries: tax incentives are used to attract investment but fail to
generate significant revenue for the government.
From an international perspective, the existence of a treaty network can be
important. The economic literature on the relationship between tax treaties and
FDI is somewhat inconclusive. 52 However, there are some persuasive studies
that show a positive correlation between existence of a tax treaty and FDI, at
least where other economic indicators favoring FDI are also present. 53 Tax
treaties also serve a signaling role, with membership in the “treaty club” offering
the promise of remedying potential double taxation and providing certainty for
multinationals considering local investment. 54 In contrast to the situation in
North America at the time NAFTA was signed, 55 no tax treaty network was
implemented before, during, or after the signing of CAFTA between its member
countries. Honduras and El Salvador are not parties to any bilateral income tax
treaty. Guatemala signed its very first such treaty in 2015, with Mexico. 56

and Guatemala and Honduras have among the highest rates of informality in Latin America);
Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI), El Salvador, PERFILES MACROFISCALES
DE CENTROAMÉRICA [MACRO-FISCAL PROFILES OF CENTRAL AMERICA], Dec. 2016, at 31, 33–34,
http://icefi.org/sites/default/files/perfiles_macrofiscales_ca_7_0.pdf#page=32&zoom=auto,74,585 [https://perma.cc/X5BQ-UCWX] (discussing problems of tax evasion and tax collection in
El Salvador, and noting fairly stagnant tax revenues in recent years).
51. See Rafael E. de Hoyos, Maurizio Bussolo & Oscar Núñez, Exports, Gender Wage Gaps
and Poverty in Honduras, 40 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 533, 534 (2012).
52. See Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S.
FDI Activity, 11 INT’L TAX & PUBLIC FIN. 601, 601 (2004) (Neth.); Eric Neumayer, Do Double
Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 43 J. DEV. STUD.
1501, 1502, 1505 (2007) (U.K.).
53. Neumayer, supra note 52, at 1505.
54. Tsilly Dagan, Tax Treaties as a Network Product, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1081, 1088
(2016).
55. The current bilateral tax treaty between the United States and Canada was signed in 1980
and amended numerous times since; the United States and Mexico signed a bilateral income tax
treaty in 1992 that entered into force in 1993; Mexico and Canada first entered into an income tax
treaty in 1991 (which was Mexico’s first comprehensive income tax treaty). Catherine Brown &
Christine Manolakas, Corporate Reorganizations and Treaty Relief from Double Taxation Within
the NAFTA Block, 59 LA. L. REV. 253, 258, 298 (1998).
56. Guatemala and Mexico Sign Double Taxation Treaty, ERNST & YOUNG (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Guatemala_and_Mexico_sign_Double_Taxation_
Treaty/$FILE/2015G_CM5330_Guatemala%20and%20Mexico%20sign%20Double%20Taxation
%20Treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFT2-B8C2].
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III. TAX REFORMS TO REDUCE THE FORCE OF MIGRATION “PUSH” FACTORS
As the foregoing discussion relates, opening to international trade has thus
far failed to improve economic conditions in the Northern Triangle, and may in
fact have exacerbated the economic problems faced by unskilled and agricultural
laborers—those most likely to emigrate. This Part of the Paper will seek to
address a few tax reforms that could aid in removing certain barriers to foreign
direct investment and economic growth in the Northern Triangle countries. Of
course, fundamental domestic tax reform in the Northern Triangle countries,
including collection and enforcement rules and practices, are necessary and are
beyond the scope of this Paper, though support of domestic reforms by the U.S.
government and international tax experts should be made a priority. 57 Further,
in order to protect the most vulnerable members of the population from the
negative impacts of trade liberalization and increased foreign investment, nontax reforms will be necessary, including labor reforms and social safety net
spending. 58 Nonetheless, this Paper will seek to assess the potential for certain
pro-development international tax reforms that may be feasible, including
development of a tax treaty network that draws on provisions of the United
Nations Model Double Taxation Convention (“UN Model Treaty”).
A.

Tax Treaties

As noted above, CAFTA introduced new trade liberalization measures to the
Northern Triangle but did not address other structural issues that could make the
parties to the agreement more competitive at attracting investment. For example,
close to the same time NAFTA was signed, the United States and Mexico
entered into a comprehensive income tax treaty. 59 This was not the case with
CAFTA, and the CAFTA countries have failed to implement any bilateral
treaties amongst themselves since then. The goal of international tax treaties has
always ostensibly been to relieve double taxation, and thus they provide some
predictability for international business interests. 60 Tax treaties impact almost

57. All the Northern Triangle countries suffer from inadequate government revenues and rely
heavily on regressive consumption taxes. Assisting developing countries in “mobilizing” tax
revenue is a problem that has caught the attention of numerous organizations, including the OECD,
the G20, and even the European Union. See, e.g., Tax and Development Programme, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/tax-and-development.htm
[https://perma.cc/HS3V-ZY3C];
Tax Revenue Mobilisation in Developing Countries: Issues and Challenges, EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE
433.849) 19 (2014). See generally Int’l Monetary Fund et al., Enhancing the Effectiveness of
External Support in Building Tax Capacity in Developing Countries, Report Prepared for
Submission to G20 Finance Ministers (July 2016) (analyzing how countries can support the
developing tax capacity challenges faced by developing countries).
58. See generally AFL-CIO Report, supra note 1.
59. See Brown & Manolakas, supra note 55, at 253.
60. Yariv Brauner, International Trade and Tax Agreements May Be Coordinated, but Not
Reconciled, 25 VA. TAX REV. 251, 261 (2005).
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all of the income resulting from the large numbers of cross-border transactions
in the world today, 61 but this is not the case for intra-CAFTA flows.
Of course, double taxation is not the primary impediment to attracting
foreign investment in the CAFTA countries, but elimination of double taxation
can be a factor making investment more attractive in a particular place,
especially given that investors typically have a choice among investment
locations. 62 Certainly, the lack of a treaty network makes the CAFTA countries
less attractive locations for investment as compared with Mexico, a country that
shares many of the competitive advantages of the Northern Triangle countries.
Thus, elimination of double taxation may help level the playing field for
developing countries vis-à-vis other countries that have access to a tax treaty
network. One study focusing on the impact of tax treaties on FDI in developing
countries found that countries aggressively pursuing the implementation of tax
treaties with developed countries saw notable increases in FDI following
conclusion of the treaties. 63
Thus, tax treaties may be an important implement in the tax policy toolbox
for attracting foreign investment. However, the current treaty regime is viewed
as problematic for developing countries in particular because it tends to limit
source-based taxation in favor of residence-based taxation, which curtails the
ability of low-income countries to tax gains from foreign investment. 64 In
addition, the revenue-dampening impacts of tax treaties, such as reducing
opportunities for tax avoidance, may be especially significant in lower-income
countries that traditionally have limited tax enforcement capabilities and may
have historically facilitated more-or-less legal tax avoidance strategies. 65
Most modern tax treaties are based on the OECD Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital (“OECD Model Treaty”), first published unofficially in
1963. 66 However, the United Nations published an alternative model treaty in
1980, based in large part on the OECD Model Treaty, but with modifications
favoring source-based taxation in order to alleviate concerns about the OECD’s
preference for residence-based taxation. 67 Some countries are prepared to adopt
61. Kim Brooks, Canada’s Evolving Tax Treaty Policy Toward Low-Income Countries, in
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS TAX DISCONTENTS: TAX POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS
189, 189 (Arthur J. Cockfield ed., 2010).
62. See Neumayer, supra note 52, at 1504.
63. See id. at 1515.
64. See id. at 1504 (“[T]he OECD model treaty clearly favours residence taxation . . . .”); see
also Brooks, supra note 61, at 190. Generally, this regime works well in treaties entered into
between developed countries, since each will act as host and home country to a more-or-less equal
extent, but in treaties between developed and developing countries, this places the poorer country
at a distinct disadvantage. See Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to SubSaharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 650–51, 650 n.36 (2005).
65. See Neumayer, supra note 52, at 1501–02.
66. Brooks, supra note 61, at 190.
67. Id. at 191.
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aspects of the UN Model Treaty in negotiating tax treaties with developing
countries. 68
Among the primary modifications offered by the UN Model Treaty is an
expansion of the scope of what constitutes a taxable permanent establishment.
This is accomplished in numerous ways. First, the UN Model Treaty reduces the
amount of time required for a project to be considered a permanent
establishment. 69 It also expands the definition of permanent establishment to
include furnishing of services through employees or other personnel for the same
or a connected project lasting six months or more. 70 It also modifies the OECD
Model Treaty’s list of circumstances excluded from the definition of permanent
establishment, even where a fixed place of business exists, by removing
“delivery of goods” from the exclusion list. 71 The UN Model also expands the
concept of dependent agent as compared to the OECD Model Treaty such that it
is easier to find a permanent establishment based on the activities of an agent. 72
It also adds a scenario where the activities of an independent agent will cause
the principle to be treated as having a permanent establishment. 73 Finally, it
expands the definition of a permanent establishment to include insurance
activities, if the insurance company collects premiums or insures risks in the
country through an employee or dependent agent in that country. 74
Additionally, the UN Model Treaty departs from the OECD Model Treaty
in several other ways that would be beneficial to capital-importing, low-income
source countries. 75 It expands the amount of profits that will be allocated to
entities with a permanent establishment in the source country, through alignment
with the “force-of-attraction” principle, and it denies a deduction for head-office
expenses that are payments for royalties, fees, interest, and certain other
management services. 76 It also makes other modifications that allow taxation of
certain types of business income, even where no permanent establishment is
found, and permits higher withholding tax rates for passive income. 77

68. Id.
69. Id. at 196.
70. Id. at 197.
71. Brooks, supra note 61, at 197.
72. Id. at 198.
73. Id. (“[I]f the [independent] agent’s activities are wholly or almost wholly devoted to the
enterprise and if the conditions of the agent’s relationship differ from those that would have been
made between independent enterprises.”).
74. Id. at 198–99.
75. See id. at 194.
76. Brooks, supra note 61, at 199–200.
77. See, e.g., id. at 200–01 (discussing how Canada, who uses the UN Model Treaty, has taken
advantage of these allowances).
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It is clear that a tax treaty is not a necessary prerequisite for attracting FDI. 78
Nonetheless, the lack of a tax treaty with the United States seems problematic in
light of the stated aims of CAFTA to encourage additional U.S. investment in
Central America, and given the “signaling” value of tax treaties for multinational
enterprises choosing among locations for investment. Adopting a standard treaty
based on the OECD Model Treaty, however, would not necessarily make up for
the loss of tax revenue to developing countries that can result from the
conclusion of the treaty. 79 Accordingly, treaty negotiations should require
inclusion of modifications in favor of source-country taxation. The United States
has been resistant to this so far, but Canada, among other countries, has
historically expressed a willingness to include such measures in its treaties with
developing countries. 80 In the interest of following through on the promises
made in connection with implementation of CAFTA, as well as reducing
immigration inflows from the Northern Triangle, the United States should revisit
this stance with respect to treaties with less developed strategic partners such as
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. 81
Certain hurdles to implementing a tax treaty network with CAFTA countries
will need to be surmounted. Typically, the United States will not enter into
income tax treaties with countries that cannot effectively implement exchange
of information agreements and source rules. 82 The Northern Triangle countries
78. See, e.g., Deborah Toaze, Tax Sparing: Good Intentions, Unintended Results, 49 CAN.
TAX J. 879, 887 (2001) (discussing the example of Brazil, which has no U.S. tax treaty but
nonetheless is a significant location for U.S. foreign direct investment, as well as trade in goods
and services).
79. See Neumayer, supra note 52, at 1504 (“[T]he OECD model treaty clearly favours
residence taxation . . . .”).
80. Brooks, supra note 61, at 195. In the past, Canada has been “willing to negotiate a tax
treaty with a low-income country that lowered the threshold of activity required before a nonresident would be subject to tax on business activities in that country.” Id.
81. Of course, this approach is disfavored by the United States because it potentially shifts tax
revenue to the other country, but the United States is already making financial outlays to support
the Northern Triangle countries, which have thus far not proven effective. For example, the
Alliance for Prosperity Plan allocated $750 million to the Northern Triangle countries to aid in
attracting FDI and support various security initiatives. Office of the Press Secretary, White House,
Fact Sheet: The United States and Central America: Honoring Our Commitments, OBAMA WHITE
HOUSE ARCHIVES (Jan. 14, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/
01/15/fact-sheet-united-states-and-central-america-honoring-our-commitments [https://perma.cc/
EA8R-N9UA]. However, the plan has been criticized because it “could end up harming, rather than
aiding, Central Americans in the long term.” Mercedes Garcia, Alliance for Prosperity Plan in the
Northern Triangle: Not Likely a Final Solution for the Central American Migration Crisis,
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.coha.org/alliance-for-prosperityplan-in-the-northern-triangle-not-a-likely-final-solution-for-the-central-american-migration-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/5ZUP-UWK5].
82. See 2016 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty art. 26(1) (“The competent authorities of the
Contracting States shall exchange such information as is reasonably relevant for carrying out the
provisions of this Convention . . . .”).
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will need significant support to carry out administrative reform before being able
to meet those requirements. 83 Nonetheless, the promise of more benevolent tax
policy by the United States with respect to investment in these countries, and
other incentives, should make the governments willing to carry out the needed
reforms, and the United States certainly has expertise to offer in aiding with tax
administration reform. 84
B.

Targeted Tax Sparing

Numerous scholars have noted the significance of revenue from taxing
cross-border investments for low-income and developing countries. 85 Such
countries thus face a conundrum: providing a favorable tax regime for
international investment, whether in the form of low statutory rates or some kind
of targeted tax incentive, is often a prerequisite to attracting the type of foreign
investment such countries seek for their economic development. On the other
hand, offering too much in the way of tax incentives or too low of a statutory tax
rate on such investments bereaves the government of needed revenue. U.S. tax
policy in this regard has not helped the dilemma faced by developing countries
in attracting investment from the United States, since the United States taxes
worldwide income of its corporations and citizens, and typically relies on foreign
tax credits to alleviate potential double taxation; 86 thus, tax incentives by
developing countries are only beneficial to U.S. investors to the extent that the
investors are able to defer U.S. taxation. In addition, the current U.S. deferral
system does not offer any advantages to those who choose to invest in
developing countries as opposed to developed countries with tax incentives. 87
While deferral is often possible, there are reforms that could be undertaken to

83. Notably, however, both Guatemala and El Salvador have signed the OECD Convention
for Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, in 2012 and 2015, respectively. Chart of
Jurisdictions Participating in the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,
OECD (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_conven
tion.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYF4-XBF2].
84. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Commentary, The Case for Tax Sparing Along with
Expanding and Limiting the Subpart F Regime, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 303, 307 (2003)
(discussing implementation of information exchange agreements with developing countries).
85. Brooks, supra note 61, at 190.
86. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
87. For example, many U.S. companies have chosen to invest in Switzerland, which will often
negotiate low tax rates with foreign multinationals. See, e.g., MAJORITY STAFF OF PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., REP. ON CATERPILLAR’S OFFSHORE TAX
STRATEGY (Aug. 28, 2014) (discussing how Caterpillar negotiated an effective corporate tax rate
of 4% to 6% with Switzerland). In recent years, Ireland has been able to attract significant foreign
investment due to its relatively low corporate tax rate (12.5%). See Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t
of Commerce, Ireland – Openness to and Restriction on Foreign Investment, EXPORT.GOV (Feb.
22, 2017), https://www.export.gov/article?id=Ireland-Openness-to-and-Restriction-on-ForeignInvestment [https://perma.cc/N9ZV-PXJ2].
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give developing countries more of the benefits sought through their tax incentive
programs.
Given the purported value of FDI to developing countries, 88 many have
enacted incentives to encourage such development. 89 As noted above,
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador all use various tax sparing devices such
as export processing zones. 90 Honduras offers special incentives for
development in the tourism industry, 91 and Guatemala has targeted incentives
for its textile industry and foreign investment in call centers servicing
international customers. 92 El Salvador and Honduras both offer incentives for
certain development related to renewable energy production. 93
One question that arises in relation to these tax incentives is whether the
home countries of investors should enact what are typically referred to as “tax
sparing” policies to help stimulate FDI in the developing countries. These
policies are “designed to promote the effectiveness of local tax incentives for
foreign investment,” typically by adjusting the tax credit procedure to account

88. See E. Borensztein, J. De Gregorio & J-W Lee, How Does Foreign Direct Investment
Affect Economic Growth?, 45 J. INT’L ECON. 115. 117–18 (1998) (discussing the positive results
from FDI for developing countries). “[A] one-dollar increase in the net inflow of FDI is associated
with an increase in total investment in the host country of more than one dollar . . . .” Id.
89. James R. Hines Jr., Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries, in
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 40 (James R. Hines Jr. ed., 2001).
90. It is worth noting that in February 2016, the Guatemalan Congress issued a law that would
curtail or eliminate some of the free trade zone incentives, while offering new expanded incentives
for call centers and investments in the textile industry. See Guatemala Enacts New Tax Incentive
Regimes Law, ERNST & YOUNG (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/internation
al-tax/alert—guatemala-enacts-new-tax-incentive-regimes-law [https://perma.cc/882Q-A6HY].
91. Honduras: Incentives for Investment in Tourism, CENTRALAMERICADATA.COM (July 20,
2017),
https://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Honduras_Incentives_for_Invest
ment_in_Tourism [https://perma.cc/BG73-6ZNE].
92. Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Affairs, 2017 Investment Climate Statements – Guatemala, U.S.
DEP’T STATE (June 29, 2017), https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2017/wha/270072.htm
[https://perma.cc/NT5U-75U9].
93. El Salvador’s Congress Approves Expansion of Tax Incentives to Promote Renewable
Energy Use in Electricity Generation, ERNST & YOUNG (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAssets/El_Salvadors_Congress_approves_expansion_of_tax_incentives_to_pro
mote_renewable_energy_use_in_electricity_generation/$FILE/2015G_CM5908_El%20Salvadors
%20Congress%20approves%20expansion%20of%20tax%20incentives%20to%20promote%20re
newable%20energy%20use%20in%20electricity%20generation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y4U-P9
DP] (discussing the incentives offered by El Salvador); Incentives Law for Renewable Energy
Generation, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/
pams/honduras/name-161265en.php?return=PG5hdiBpZD0iYnJlYWRjcnVtYiI-PGEgaHJlZj0iL
yI-SG9tZTwvYT4gJnJhcXVvOyA8YSBocmVmPSIvcG9saWNpZXNhbmRtZWFzdXJlcy8iPlB
vbGljaWVzIGFuZCBNZWFzdXJlczwvYT4gJnJhcXVvOyA8YSBocmVmPSIvcG9saWNpZXN
hbmRtZWFzdXJlcy9yZW5ld2FibGVlbmVyZ3kvIj5SZW5ld2FibGUgRW5lcmd5PC9hPjwvbmF
2Pg,,&s=dHlwZT1yZSZzdGF0dXM9T2s [https://perma.cc/8WZM-7U3E] (discussing the
incentives offered by Honduras).
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for the intended incentive benefit. 94 Studies have generally found that tax
sparing is effective at stimulating FDI. 95 For example, in a study looking at
Japanese tax sparing policies,
[t]he results indicate that “tax sparing” is effective in stimulating FDI. Japanese
firms locate a much higher fraction of their foreign investment in countries with
whom Japan has tax sparing agreements than do American firms. Furthermore,
host governments appear to grant Japanese firms significant tax reductions that
are not available to their American counterparts. All other things equal, tax
sparing agreements are associated with 140% to 240% higher FDI levels and
23% lower tax rates on FDI. 96

The findings related to tax sparing indicate that adoption of targeted tax sparing
policies could increase the amount of U.S.-source FDI to host country
beneficiaries of the tax sparing provisions. 97
A different but related policy approach has been proposed by Professor
Karen Brown, who has advocated a targeted exemption scheme for income to
U.S. residents from investment in certain developing countries in Africa. 98 The
proposed exemption would begin at the time of implementation of a tax treaty
with the particular country and would last for an initial experimental period of
ten to fifteen years. 99 The treaty would include safeguards delineating the type
of foreign-source income eligible for the exemption, for example, income from
manufacturing activities, natural resource exploration, or research and
development. 100
These proposals face hurdles to implementation in the United States, which
has historically rejected tax sparing. One obstacle to tax sparing has been the
policy focus on neutralities, including capital export neutrality, which dictates
that tax policy not distort incentives to invest in one location or another (i.e., that
tax policy should be neutral with respect to the location of the investment). 101

94. Hines Jr., supra note 89, at 40 (“[T]ax sparing often takes the form of allowing firms to
claim foreign tax credits against home-country tax liabilities that would have been paid to foreign
governments . . . .”).
95. Thompson, Jr., supra note 84, at 305.
96. Id. (quoting Hines Jr., supra note 89, at 41).
97. Id. at 306.
98. Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules Accommodate
Investment in Developing Countries?, 23 U. PENN. J. INT’L ECON. L. 45, 51–52 (2002) (advocating
that “income derived from investment in sub-Saharan nations” should not be subject to U.S. income
taxation).
99. Id. at 52.
100. Id. Each such treaty would also need to include information exchange provisions and what
Professor Brown called “sovereignty preserving” provisions requiring the host nation to implement
minimum standards relating to natural resource preservation, labor protection, and infrastructure
development. Id.
101. See David A. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy 2, 3 (Univ. of
Chi. Law Sch., Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 697, 2014). This will cause
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Both Professor Brown’s exemption proposal and tax sparing policies generally
explicitly reject capital export neutrality in order to actively encourage
investment in a particular location or region, to achieve certain policy goals.
Given the dire economic situation in the Northern Triangle, and the clear U.S.
interest in remedying that situation, this would be an opportune juncture to
reconsider capital export neutrality.
Nonetheless, there are legitimate concerns about the benefits of tax sparing
in general (which may also apply to Professor Brown’s more far-reaching
proposal). Other criticisms have noted that tax incentives to attract foreign
investment can actually be counter-productive in the long term, causing
unintended economic distortions, encouraging inefficient tax planning,
introducing complexity and uncertainty, consuming scarce resources without
generating much revenue, and furthering harmful tax competition. 102 However,
to the extent that developing countries use tax incentives anyway, as is the case
with the Northern Triangle countries, there are arguments in favor of using
carefully crafted, targeted, non-reciprocal tax sparing provisions in relevant tax
treaties. 103 Given that tax sparing has been used by other developing countries,
there is some evidence and a model to look to in implementing such policies visà-vis the Northern Triangle countries. Care should be taken, however, to avoid
potential pitfalls of tax sparing, such as short-term investment designed to take
advantage of the tax benefits and repatriation encouraged by tax sparing without
engaging in real, long-term investment in the developing country. 104 In light of
these hazards and the general question about the value of tax incentives, it seems
that including tax sparing provisions in any tax treaties negotiated with the
Northern Triangle countries should not be a priority. Offering support in tax
administration reform and other related areas would likely be a more effective
way that the United States could assist these countries in raising much-needed
revenue.
CONCLUSION
The problems of poverty, inequality, gang violence, and instability in the
Northern Triangle are complex and stem from intertwining multi-factored
causes. Some of the tax reforms noted above may strengthen prospects for
foreign direct investment and provide much-needed revenue for the government
investors to “choose the location of their investments based on where they can get the highest pretax return.” Id. at 3.
102. See, e.g., Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in LowIncome Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEEN’S L.J. 505, 541-43, 546 (2009)
(Can.).
103. Id. at 548–49.
104. See, e.g., OECD, TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION 22–23, 26–27, 35 (1998) (urging
careful definition of the tax incentives that are made eligible for the tax sparing policies, among
other proposals to ensure that tax sparing does not lead to inappropriate tax avoidance schemes).
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to aid in efforts to address corruption, crime, inequality, and, ultimately, the
violence and poverty plaguing the population. However, there are many
challenges ahead for these countries, as well as for the United States and other
allies interested in stemming the tide of migrants and remedying the persistent
instability of these Central American nations. Nonetheless, it is important to find
avenues for cooperation that will benefit all stakeholders.
From a practical perspective, this will require political will that probably
does not currently exist in the Northern Triangle governments or the United
States. As a report by the Congressional Research Service explains:
Central American political elites have long benefitted from emigration to the
United States, which serves as a “safety valve” that reduces social pressure to
address high rates of unemployment and devastation wrought by periodic natural
disasters. . . . Moreover, the governments of the northern triangle countries
generally have been unable or unwilling to increase revenues, which are
currently inadequate to meet public needs. Elites in all three countries have
vigorously opposed efforts to raise taxes even though tax rates in the northern
triangle countries are comparatively low and regressive. 105

Additionally, recent political developments in the United States make it unlikely
that there will be political will to reform CAFTA, negotiate new tax treaties, or
provide support for local tax reform. 106 One possible avenue for cooperation
may be Mexico, which arguably has the greatest interest in promoting stability
and economic development with its southern neighbors. However, it is also
unlikely that Mexico has the necessary international clout, or the resources on
its own, to promote the needed reforms successfully.
Nonetheless, it is important to consider approaches to remedying the
situation, which is not likely to improve on its own. A hands-off isolationist
response by the United States merely delays the inevitable, as the problems will
likely continue without strong international coordination and assistance in
passing reforms. Tax reforms such as those proposed above, which could be
implemented via bilateral tax treaty, may be more politically palatable, and
ultimately have better long-term impacts, than grants of direct aid. 107 Finally, it
105. PETER J. MEYER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43702, UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN
(2016).
106. The Trump administration has generally been critical of free trade agreements and has
adopted an “America First” approach to trade and foreign policy in general. See America First
Foreign Policy, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy
[https://perma.cc/4WGZ-6Y9X]. The tax reform enacted in the United States at the end of 2017
reduced the domestic tax rate on U.S. Corporations and moves the United States closer toward a
territorial international tax system. Tax cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, § 11001, 131 Stat.
2054 (2017). However, it is unclear what the impact of these provisions will be on the Northern
Triangle countries in terms of U.S. investment.
107. Direct aid programs may be helpful and are certainly common, as illustrated by the
Alliance for Prosperity Plan implemented in 2014. See Garcia, supra note 81 and accompanying
text. However, these programs are heavily dependent on political mood and do not provide steady
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must be acknowledged that the tax reform proposals considered in this Paper
could not be immediately implemented, given the tax treaty negotiation and
implementation process, even if the political will to enact them currently existed.
Thus, in the short-term, other efforts and support will be required to address the
problems driving the current wave of immigration from the Northern Triangle.
Ideally, such efforts should not be short sighted. For example, much of the
funding from the Alliance for Prosperity has focused on security measures; this
approach has been criticized for numerous reasons, including driving up human
rights abuses by the Northern Triangle governments. 108 Longer-term reforms
will still be needed, and specially tailored tax treaties could be an important tool
for the United States to provide assistance in this regard.

flows of income in the way that FDI could. Further, direct aid grants are often dedicated to certain
programs and/or conditioned on structural changes that hamper their effectiveness. See, e.g.,
Brown, supra note 98, at 51 (discussing the limited benefit of direct aid programs for Africa and
developing countries generally).
108. See Laura Iesue, The Alliance for Prosperity Plan: A Failed Effort for Stemming
Migration, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.coha.org/the-alliancefor-prosperity-plan-a-failed-effort-for-stemming-migration/#_ftnref1 [https://perma.cc/K6MN-53
TW].

